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VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
THE TRUTH-IN-NEGOTIATIONS ACT: THE NEED FOR
BOTH TRUTH AND FAIRNESS
[The Villanova Law Review, in 1968, published a Comment
entitled "The 'Truth-In-Negotiating' Clause of P.L. 87-653 as Inter-
preted by the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals"* which
explored several problem areas created by the Truth-In-Negotiations
Act. The present Comment has undertaken to examine the problem
areas presently underlying the Act in light of recent Court of Claims
decisions which have reviewed Board doctrine concerning the dis-
closure of cost or pricing data.] - (EDITOR'S NOTE)
I. INTRODUCTION
Almost eight years have passed since The Truth-In-Negotiations Act'
was enacted into law.2 During this period of time considerable controversy
has arisen over the scope and meaning of some of the provisions of the
Act. It is the purpose of this Comment to trace the legislative history of
the Act, to analyze relevant court and Armed Services Board of Contract
Appeals (Board) decisions and to examine in detail four of the most
troublesome problems that have arisen under the Act. Considerations of
fairness are interwoven into the fabric of the Act and these considerations
will be explored in discussing the problems of defining the meaning of cost
or pricing data, considering the scope of the causation requirement, ex-
amining the problem of offsets and finally, determining the responsibility
of the prime contractor for defective data submitted by the subcontractor.
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Public Law 87-653, was, for the most part, the result of extensive
overpricing by federal contractors, discovered by various audits undertaken
the General Accounting Office (GAO) . Between 1957 and 1962 the GAO
discovered overcharges amounting to $61 million 4 resulting from the con-
tractors' failure to provide government negotiators with complete, accurate
and current cost and pricing data.5 The importance of this problem was
* 13 VILL. L. REV. 604 (1968).
1. 10 U.S.C. § 2306(f) (1964).
2. P.L. 87-653 was signed into law by President Kennedy on Sept. 10, 1962.
3. See, e.g., Hearings Pursuant to Section 4, Public Law 86-89 before the
Special Subcomm. on Procurement Practices of Dep't of Defense of the House Comm.
on Armed Services, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. at 64-70 (1960).
4. Hearings on Relation of Cost Data to Military Procurement Before the
Subcomm. For Special Investigation of the House Comm. on Armed Services, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess. at 6 (1963).
5. Id. According to one knowledgeable official:
The buyer's lack of knowledge . . . of the latest cost data available to the
vendor in establishing prices is the most important weakness observed in the
cases (of overpricing). This has resulted in excessive prices being paid by the
Government.
Hearings on Weapons System Management Before the Subcomm. for Special Investi-
gations of The House Comm. on Armed Services, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. at 350 (1959).
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reflected in prompt congressional hearings to thoroughly examine the
problem" and the revision by the Department of Defense (DOD) of its
cost certification procedures. This change in the Armed Services Procure-
ment Regulations (ASPR) required contractors to submit "current, com-
plete, and correct cost or pricing data' 7 with the purpose of prohibiting
excessive profiteering by contractors. Congress, however, was not entirely
satisfield with leaving matters in that posture. Accordingly, Congressman
Vinson sponsored a bill s which prohibited contractors from overcharges on
incentive-type contracts.9 The Department of Defense, however, opposed
this bill expressing, along with objections to specific sections of the pro-
posed law, a general feeling that the Department's previously enacted regu-
lations were sufficient and that the proposed law was too inflexible. The
Department also objected to limiting the statute to cover only incentive
contracts. 10 In spite of these objections the House endorsed the bill on
June 7, 1962 and it was forwarded to the Senate Armed Service Com-
mittee for its consideration. That committee extended the bill to all types
of contracts' 1 and agreed with Congressman Vinson that there was a need
6. E.g., Hearings Before the Procurement Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on
Armed Services, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 146 (1960).
7. On October 1, 1959, the following provision was added to Armed Services
Procurement Regulation 3-807.3 [hereinafter cited as ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 3.807-3
(Supp. 1970)] :
Some form of price analysis should be made in every procurement, even when
competitive proposals have been submitted. The presence of effective competition,
however, may make it possible to limit considerably the degree of price analysis
required. In the absence of effective price competition, the negotiating team
must make a thorough analysis of contractors' proposals and must be in possession
of current, complete and correct cost or pricing data before decisions are made
on contract prices. Accordingly, the contractor should be required to furnish such
data promptly as it becomes available throughout the negotiation process. To
assure that the negotiating team is in possession of such data, the certificate set
forth in ASPR 3-807.7 shall be obtained for each separate negotiation when the
amount of the procurement action exceeds $100,000, and the price negotiated is
based more on the contractor's actual or estimated cost than on effective com-
petition, established catalog or market prices, or prices set by law or regula-
tion. . . . (emphasis added).
8. H.R. 5532, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (g) (1961):
No contracts shall be negotiated under this title containing a profit formula
that would allow the contractor increased fees or profits for cost reductions or
target cost underruns, unless the contractor shall have certified that the cost
data be submitted in negotiations for the fixing of the target cost or price was
current, accurate, and complete; and such contracts shall contain a provision that
the target cost or price shall be adjusted to exclude any sums by which it may
have been found after audit that the target cost or price may have been increased
as a result of any inaccurate, incomplete or noncurrent data.
9. The incentive-type contract is essentially one which awards extra profit as an
incentive to generate lower costs and better performance. Congressman Vinson
believed that such a contract encouraged deceptive pricing since a contractor would
pad the overall contract price in order to be rewarded on an incentive basis. SPECIAL
SUBCOMM. ON PROCUREMENT PRACTICES OF THE DEP'T OF DEFENSE, HOUSE ARMED
SERVICES COMM., REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 4, PUBLIC LAW 86-89, H.R. REP.
No. 1959, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1960).
10. Text of Letter in H.R. REP. No. 1638 on H.R. 5532, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-12
(1962).
11. S. REPs. No. 1884, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1962).
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for legislation since the Department of Defense cost certification pro-
cedures were being largely ignored. 12
The Senate Committee was confronted with objections to passage of
the law from the Department of Defense,"1 other senators and industry
spokesmen. Senator Engle was concerned with the possibility of the con-
tractor being penalized for an honest mistake or for not being able to de-
termine his true costs. 14 Senator Symington replied that the ignorant con-
tractor would not be injured by this law since "we are trying to get as
much truth as possible into negotiations.' u5 Industry spokesmen, on the
other hand, were concerned that the term "data" was not defined and that
actual and estimated costs were not distinguished.16 Moreover, they raised
the problem of offsets and felt that the contractor should not only be penal-
ized because of overpricing but should also benefit from their mistakes
in underpricing items.17 In order to meet some of these objections further
Committee studies were undertaken with the result that, after certain modi-
fications,18 H.R. 5532 was enacted into law as Public-Law 87-653 on
September 10, 1962 and became effective on December 1, 1962."
12. Responding to a request by a member of the House, the GAO reviewed 276negotiated contracts entered into by the Army and Navy since January 1960 andfound that 121 of these contracts involving $253 million did not include cost andpricing data certificates. See Roback, Truth in Negotiating: The Legislative Back-ground of P.L. 87-653, 1 PUB. CONT. L.J. 3, 19 (1968). Chairman Russell of theSenate Armed Services Committee remarked:
If the departments are not complying with these regulations which weredrawn, let me see, two years ago, I believe, I see no alternative for us but toundertake to make it mandatory by passing a law on the subject.Hearings on H.R. 5532 Before Senate Comm. on Armed Services, 87th Cong., 2dSess. at 46 (1962).13. The Department of Defense objected to the enactment of the Bill on essen-tially the same grounds as did the House viz, that there was no need for such a statutebecause of the regulations in effect and the objection to limiting the statute to onlyincentive-type contracts. As previously noted, the Senate Committee was unimpressedwith the former argument and complied with the latter. Hearings, supra note 12, at 26.14. Id.
15. Id.16. Id. at 99-100. Senator Symington expressed genuine concern with this pointof view and indicated that data which was required to be certified by the contractorwould only have to be certified "to the best of his knowledge and belief." Id.17. Id. Senator Symington was less impressed with this view as indicated by hisremark to the spokesman: "Don't reach out for the last cherry to the point whereyou break this branch." Id. at 100. Other general industry objections were the possi-bility of criminal sanction being imposed on innocent offenders, that the bill wascompletely one sided in favor of the government and would discourage incentive
contracting. Id. at 95, 103.18. There was language added that certificates would be required for all con-tracts and most subcontracts over $100,000. and price adjustments for defective data.This requirement of certificates would not be adhered to:
where the price negotiated is based on (1) adequate price competition, (2) estab-lished catalog or market prices of commercial items sold in substantial quantitiesto general public, (3) law or regulation, or (4) in exceptional cases where thehead of the agency determines that the requirement may be waived and statesin writing his reasons for such a determination.S. REP. No. 1884, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1962).A proposed amendment was suggested in 1963 by Representative Herbertwhich would, in effect, permit offsets in price adjustments, so that mistakes in bothoverpricing and underpricing would be taken into effect and would authorize priceadjustments only when the contractor had actual knowledge that the data was defec-tive. H.R. 7909, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. (1963).19. 108 CONG. REC. 17351, 17920 (1962). 10 U.S.C. § 2306(f) (1964). For adetailed examination of the legislative history of the Truth-In-Negotiation Act, see
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The statutory scheme of the Truth in Negotiations Act provides that
a prime contractor or a subcontractor must submit to the government nego-
tiators cost or pricing data prior to the award of any contract exceeding
$100,000 and prior to the pricing of any contract change exceeding
$100,000. The contractor must certify to the negotiators that to the best
of his knowledge and belief the cost or pricing data that he is submitting
is accurate, complete and current. Furthermore, each prime contract as
well as supplemental changes to that contract must contain a proviso that
the final price to be charged to the Government will not include any sig-
nificant sums which will result in an increase in the contract price due to
the failure of the prime contractor or any subcontractor to furnish ac-
curate, complete and current cost or pricing data.2 0
III. THE MEANING OF COST AND PRICING DATA
An essential prerequisite for any contractor who undertakes to con-
tract with the federal government is to know what information he must
submit during negotiations. The Board has uniformly adhered to the defi-
nition given in the Armed Services Procurement Regulations 21 which dis-
Roback, Truth in Negotiating: The Legislative Background of P.L. 87-653, 1 PuB.
CONT. L.J. 3 (1968).
20. The Act states:(f) A Prime Contractor or any subcontractor shall be required to submit cost
or pricing data under the circumstances listed below, and shall be required
to certify that, to the best of his knowledge and belief, the cost or pricing
data he submitted was accurate, complete and current-(1) Prior to the award of any negotiated prime contract under this title
where the price is to exceed $100,000;(2) Prior to the pricing of any contract change or modification for
which the price adjustment is expected to exceed $100,000 or such
lesser amount as may be prescribed by the head of the agency;(3) Prior to the award of a subcontract at any tier, where the prime
contractor and each higher tier subcontractor have been required
to furnish such a certificate, if the price of such contract is expeted
[sic] to exceed $100,000; or(4) Prior to the pricing of any contract change or modification to a
subcontract covered by (3) above, for which the price adjustment
is expected to exceed $100,000, or such lesser amount as may be
prescribed by the head of the agency.
Any prime contract or change or modification thereto under which such
certificate is required shall contain a provision that the price to the Government,
including profit or fee, shall be adjusted to exclude any significant sums by which
it may be determined by the head of the agency that such price was increased
because the contractor or any subcontractor required to furnish such a certificate,
furnished cost or pricing data which, as of a date agreed upon between the parties(which date shall be as close to the date of agreement on the negotiated price
as is practicable), was inaccurate, incomplete, or noncurrent; Provided, That
the requirements of this subsection need not be applied to contracts or subcontracts
where the price negotiated is based on adequate price competition, established
catalog or market prices of commercial items sold in substantial quantities to the
general public, prices set by law or regulation or, in exceptional cases where the
head of the agency determines that the requirements of this subsection may be
waived and states in writing his reasons for such determination.
10 U.S.C. § 2306(f) (1964).
21. The regulations state that:
"Cost or pricing data" as used in this subpart refers to that portion of the
contractor's submission which is factual. The requirement for "cost or pricing
data" subject to certification is satisfied when all facts reasonably available to
COMMENTS
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tinguish between verifiable facts relating to costs, and data that is essen-
tially speculative in nature or involves an estimate or judgment on the part
of the contractor.22 For example in Defense Electronics, Inc.238 the con-
tract stipulated that Defense Electronics was to furnish telemetry systems
to the Government. The contractors had received price quotations from
two different subcontractors for a component of the contract item. One of
the subcontractors offered a quantity discount if additional quantities were
ordered from the prime contractor by the Government. However, the
prime contractor failed to disclose this fact to the Government and also
failed to disclose pricing data concerning the cost of certain conversion
kits. In considering the contractor's failure to disclose this information the
Board held that the Government was not entitled to a price reduction under
the defective pricing provision of the contract. In so deciding, the Board
outlined what kind of information qualifies as "cost or pricing data" and
is therefore required to be submitted by the contractor:
For the purpose of the defective pricing data statute and regula-
,tions, "cost or pricing data" is defined by ASPR3-807.3(e) as "that
portion of the contractor's submission which is factual." The duty to
disclose is satisfied when all FACTS reasonably available to the con-
tractor which might reasonably be expected to affect the negotiated
price are accurately disclosed. ASPR3-807.1 (e), cost or pricing data
includes such factual matters as vendor quotations and "all facts
which can reasonably be expected to contribute to sound estimates of
future costs." Being factual, it is the type of information that can be
verified. It does not apply to or make representations as to the ac-
the contractor up to the time of agreement on price and which might reasonably
be expected to affect the price negotiations are accurately disclosed to the con-
tracting officer or his representative. The definition of cost or pricing data em-
braces more than historical accounting data; it also includes, where applicable,
such factors as vendor quotations, non-recurring costs, changes in production
methods and production or procurement volume, unit cost trends such as those
associated with labor efficiency, and make-or-buy decisions or any other man-
agement decisions which could reasonably be expected to have a significant
bearing on costs under the proposed contract. In short, cost or pricing data
consist of all facts which can reasonably be expected to contribute to sound
estimates of future costs as well as to the validity of costs already incurred. Cost
or pricing data, being factual, is that type of information which can be verified.
Because the contractor's certificate pertains to "cost or pricing data," it does not
make representations as to the accuracy of the contractor's judgment as to the
estimated portion of future costs or projections. It does, however, apply to the
data upon which the contractor's judgment is based. This distinction between
fact and judgment should be clearly understood.
ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 3.807-3(e) (Supp. 1970).
22. The Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals cases which have undertaken
to define what is cost or pricing data include: Defense Electronics, Inc., ASBCA
No. 11127, 66-1 BCA 26,191 (1966) (Cancellation Clauses); FMC Corp., ASBCA
Nos. 10095, 11113, 66-1 BCA 25,696 (1966) (scrap prices) (information on experi-
ments in process is not cost data in a fixed price contract) ; Radio Engineering Labs.,
ASBCA No. 11052, 67-2 BCA 20,071 (1967) (costs of tests) ; Lockheed Aircraft
Corp., ASBCA No. 10453, 67-1 BCA 29,439 (1967) (subcontractor's labor estimates
are not cost data). For an earlier view on the scope of the cost and price certification
requirement, see Cuneo & Crowell, Negotiated Contracts - Two-Step Procurement,
Cost and Pricing Data Requirements and Protests to the Comptroller General, 5 B.C.
IND. & Comm. L. REv. 43, 53 (1964).
23. A7.-BCA No. 11127, 66-1 BCA 26,191 (1966).
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curacy of the contractor's judgment in estimating future costs. A
clear distinction is drawn between "facts" and "judgment". 24
Although the definition on its face appears easy to cope with, its ap-
plication to particular factual situations is not at all certain. In Sparton
Corp.,25 the Government had contracted to purchase sonobuoys from Spar-
ton after Sparton had submitted a materials list containing price quotations
which were in excess of prices offered by an untried subcontractor. For
various reasons Sparton subsequently awarded the subcontract to the pre-
viously untried subcontractor and the Government contended that since
the contractor did not submit these quotations it had therefore failed to
submit accurate, current and complete data. The Board rejected this argu-
ment by stating:
In the definition of cost and pricing data which was set out
(earlier) it is stated that vendor's quotations are considered to be cost
and pricing data which should be disclosed, but this is qualified by the
caveat that such data should "reasonably be expected to have a sig-
nificant bearing on costs . . . [T]he Government does not prove its
case unless it shows that the contractor, at the time the data is sub-
mitted, did not intend to deal with the vendor listed, but did intend
to do business with the lower cost vendor.26
Since Sparton, however, the Board has aparently retreated to a more
flexible and encompassing position. In Bell & Howell Co.,27 for example,
the Government entered into a contract for the purchase of ammunition
in which Bell & Howell failed to disclose to the Government the lowest
available quotations from an untried supplier. The Board curiously agreed
with the Spartan test that the quotes must be data which "might reason-
ably be expected to affect the price negotiations ' 28 but felt that a key
distinction in this case was that Bell & Howell, at the time of contracting,
was actively and vigorously conducting negotiations with the low bidder.
In support of its decision the Board referred to its decision in Cutler-
Hammer, Inc. 2 9 which also involved the status of a vendor's quotations.
In Cutler-Hammer the contractor failed to disclose to the Government that
he was considering a bid from an antenna lens supplier to be used in a
complex reconnaissance system. While the quotation received from the
untried vendor was considerably lower than the quotations submitted to
the Government the contractor thought the bid was meritorious enough to
request a further technical proposal. However it was not until after negoti-
ations with the Government had been completed that Cutler-Hammer
24. Id. at 26,203-04 (emphasis added).
25. ASBCA No. 11363, 67-2 BCA 30,373 (1967).
26. Id. at 30,381 (emphasis added).
27. ASBCA No. 11999, 68-1 BCA 32,335 (1968).
28. Id. at 32,347.
29. ASBCA No. 10900, 67-2 BCA 29,822 (1967). For a discussion of this case,
see Comment, The "Truth-In-Negotiating" Clause of P.L. 87-653 As Interpreted by
the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals, 13 VILL. L. REv. 604, 611-12 (1968).
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awarded the contract to the untried vendor. On these facts the Board held
that the Government was entitled to a price reduction since the low quo-
tations were "significant from the stand-point of over-all contract negotia-
tion." 30 Quite remarkably, in view of this holding, the Board also com-
mented that the vendor's quotation "was far from being data upon which
a firm price reduction could have been reached."' 31 On appeal, the Court
of Claims upheld the Board on this issue.32 The court rejected the con-
tractor's argument that the only data that need be submitted is that data
upon which a reasonable businessman would rely in negotiating a contract.
Rather, the court found it significant that the contractor had gone beyond
merely accepting the quotation and had followed it up by requesting a
technical proposal thereby indicating that the contractor was "actively
negotiating" with the vendor. Judge Nichols dissented on this issue stating
that the contractor was being unjustly penalized for merely following up
on the bid by requesting a technical proposal to confirm its initial belief
that the vendor could not possibly perform at such a low figure.33
It seems clear that the Board and courts have confused the determina-
tion as to when a vendor's quotations constitute cost or pricing data. This
confusion has been primarily caused by three factors. First, Sparton
clearly expressed the view that the Government must prove that at the time
the data was submitted the contractor had no intention of dealing with
the vendor whose quotations were submitted to the Government.3 4 How-
ever the Board in Bell & Howell and the court in Cutler-Hammer clearly
impose much less of a burden on the Government. In both of these cases
the contractors were dealing with untried vendors who had submitted quo-
tations considerably lower than those received from other proven vendors.
It seems quite possible that many contractors in similar circumstances
would have no intention whatsoever of dealing with such an untried vendor
at the time of contracting. If the Board wishes to impose on a contractor
the duty to submit all quotations which he receives, or in the alternative,
all quotations on which the contractor takes some "follow-up" action; it
should be more explicit. Secondly, it is evident that the Board and the
court have retreated from the test enunciated in Sparton - that the data
should be of such a nature that it would "reasonably be expected to have
a significant bearing on costs." '3 5 As previously noted, the Board in Cutler-
Hammer conceded that the untried vendor's quotation could not have been
relied on in reaching a price reduction in the contract. It therefore seems
doubtful that quotations which were so uncertain as to their validity that
30. ASBCA No. 10900, 67-2 BCA 29,822, 28 (1967).
31. Id.
32. Cutler-Hammer, Inc. v. United States, 416 F.2d 1306 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
33. Judge Nichols also felt that the contractor should not be penalized since there
had been virtually no way for the contractor to have known that such a low quota-
tion would qualify as "cost or pricing data" because of the lack of Board decisions on
this issue and also because the government had failed to notify the contractor that
such information should be submitted. Id. at 1319.
34. See text accompanying note 25 supra.
35. See text accompanying note 26 supra.
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they would not effect a price reduction should be reasonably expected to
affect price negotiations. The suggestion has been made that the Board is
seeking to establish the rule that if the undisclosed data might affect the
contract price, such data would be within the ambit of the Act.36 However,
at no time has the Board explicitly stated this to be the proper test. If this
can be considered to be the appropriate test then contractors would
be well-advised to submit all price quotations which they are "con-
sidering" to the Government during negotiations. This is the course
of action suggested by the language of the court in Cutler-Hammer.7
Thirdly, the Board and the courts have not yet addressed them-
selves to the problem of what result should be reached when the
contractor considers only one cost quotation prior to completion of its
negotiations with the Government and then, after the certificate is filed,
takes advantage of a lower cost proposal. The court in Cutler-Hammer
opined that no reduction in the contract price could be imposed on the
contractor under the Act since the "costs were accurate, complete and cur-
rent as of the filing of the certificate."38 Such a result would be anamolous
since contractors could argue that they neglected to reveal a quotation be-
cause they did not consider it "cost or pricing data."'39 Furthermore, if the
pivotal determinations are to be whether the contractor "vigorously negoti-
ated" with the untried vendor40 or whether the contractor "considered" using
a lower bidder,41 the result may well be an emasculation of the Act since
contractors may refuse to accept quotations from those bidders expected
to submit low bids, thus increasing the contract price to the Government.
After filing the pricing certificate the contractor might then "discover" that
a lower cost was available and no price reduction would apparently be
available to the Government.
It is suggested that either legislative or judicial action is needed to
correct the confusion concerning vendor's quotations. While a rigid arbi-
trary rule would appear to be inappropriate it is felt that a workable and
fair test could be enunciated by the Board to alleviate the presently-existing
confusion. The proper standard to be applied should indicate that in the
absence of special circumstances all vendor's quotations which have not
been discarded by the contractor as clearly unreasonable prior to the com-
pletion of negotiations should be submitted to the Government. Moreover,
the Act should be amended to allow a downward revision of the contract
36. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 29, and Gusman, A Critical Study of the
"Truth In Negotiating Law," 54 CORNELL L. REV. 708 (1969).
37. Our decision as to this facet of the case should not be construed as indicating
that Cutler-Hammer had planned to include the higher . . .quotation in its pro-
posal only until the certificate was filed, and then intended to use ... the ...
lower bid. All we are saying is that when a contractor goes beyond merely
receiving a quotation, and considers using a lower bidder, that possibility should be
reported to the Government.
416 F.2d 1306, 1314 (emphasis added).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Bell & Howell Co., ASBCA No. 11999, 68-1 BCA 32,335 (1968).
41. Cutler-Hammer, Inc. v. United States, 416 F.2d 1306 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
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price when the contractor takes advantage of a lower-cost quotation after
the certificate has been filed. This standard would not infringe on the
benefits conferred by the Act upon the contractor who by his own efficiency
and ingenuity lowers the overall cost of the contract since the lower quota-
tion has been received from a third person and is independent of the con-
tractor's own efforts.42
Of course, it may be contended that a more thorough re-appraisal of
the entire concept of what type of data falls within the ambit of the cost
and pricing requirement is needed in view of industry-wide criticism that
present definitions provide relatively little guidance.43 One commentator
has suggested that the Act be amended so as to require the contractor to
submit all information developed by the contractor's estimating and pricing
personnel whether or not it was used in the ultimate price proposal. Such
information would be limited to the first and second levels of backup data
used in support of the cost breakdown. Moreover, the contractor would
be required to make available for Government inspection all directly perti-
42. There had been some dispute in the past as to the meaning of the requirement
that the cost or pricing data be "current." A contractor was required to certify his
cost or pricing data at various stages of his negotiations, as, for example, when he
submitted his initial proposal, later while negotiations are being conducted and still
later when the negotiations are completed and before the contract is signed. However,
ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 3,807-3(e) (Supp. 1970), has appeared to reach a reasonable
solution. That regulation provides that the data is considered to be current "when
all facts reasonably available to the contractor up to the time of agreement on price"
(emphasis added) is submitted. Therefore, the data is considered current when agree-
ment on price was reached rather than perhaps some months later when the formal
contract is reached. See Bannerman, Comments on P.L. 87-653 and Changes in the
ASPR Implementation, 1 PUB. CONT. L.J. 30, 34 (July 1968).
43. See Hannah, Bond & Virden, The Contractor Looks At The "Truth In
Negotiations" Act, 1 PUB. CONT. L.J. 38 (1968), where the authors interpret the
legislative history of the Act to only require the contractor to submit facts derived
from generally accepted estimating procedures as well as other data specifically con-
sidered by him in his price proposal. The authors reject the onerous burden allegedly
imposed on contractors because of ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 3.807-3(e) (Supp. 1970), and
the decisions of the Board which have further defined the concept. See note 22 supra.
The authors level further criticism at the present concept of cost or pricing data
by stating:
In view of the ever broadening definition of "data," some contractors have
come to suspect that some Government negotiators sometimes learn from audit
reports or otherwise of the possible existence of data that have not been disclosed,
but which may be insufficiently significant or too speculative to be used to effect
a reduction of price at the negotiation stage. Therefore, instead of requiring the
data to be submitted at that point, the information is used as the basis for a later
request for price reduction. To avoid the adverse publicity which might result
from institution of formal proceedings involving charges of nondisclosure, the
contractor is pressured into agreeing to a price reduction he would not have
accepted before the contract was executed. Even if these suspicions are not so far
justified, certainly the possibilities of this kind of action exist.
It should be obvious that no contractor with a complex organization can
search out, identify or submit all data available to him which a tribunal might
later say "could reasonably be expected to contribute to sound estimates" of
costs or prices. Contractors recognize that (and we quote from contractor
responses) "it is impossible to disclose all facts which may be relevant to prices";
"cost or pricing data are never absolutely accurate, complete and current, but
only reasonably so. Consequently, hypercritical Government representatives can
always find areas of disagreement."
Hannah, supra at 40.
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nent books and records. 44 It is posited that such an amendment should be
adopted by Congress. It has already been suggested in this Comment that,
with regard to vendor's quotes, some uniform criteria should be estab-
lished to provide sufficient guidance for contractors. It would appear that
an amendment to the Act, similar to that proposed, would provide uni-
formity in this area as well as remove many of the burdensome require-
ments of the present law to which many contractors have objected. 45 Ad-
ditionally, it would assure that there would be a reasonable amount of data
available to the Government so that an accurate price can be agreed upon.
Furthermore, this proposed amendment would be entirely consistent with
the standard which was proposed when dealing with vendor's quotation.4 6
IV. THE SCOPE OF TH'E CAUSATION REQUIREMENT
The problem of when defective cost or pricing data causes an increase
in the contract price has been a source of concern to the Board and com-
mentators alike.47 The Truth In Negotiations Act provides that the con-
tract price be reduced to exclude "any significant sums by which it may be
determined ... that such price was increased because the contract .. .
furnished cost or pricing data which ...was inaccurate, incomplete, or
noncurrent .... -4" It would appear from this language alone that Con-
gress has imposed upon the Government the burden of proving that the
defective data caused a significant price increase. However, the decisions
that have been handed down on this question have put a different gloss on
this language of the Act.
In American Bosch Arma Corp.,49 American had contracted to furnish
the Government missile guidance systems comprised of complex electronic
equipment. American had failed to disclose certain data which resulted
in an overstatement of the contract price by $45,529, which was less than
one-half of one percent of the total contract price of $15,000,000. In the
instant decision, which was handed down prior to the passage of the Act,5"
44. See Cibinic, Truth in Negotiations: The Need for Legislative Changes, 1 PUB.
CONT. L.J. 46 (1968).
45. See note 43 supra.
46. If the proposed amendment is adopted it would not entirely alleviate any
necessity for a complementary standard in the area of vendor's quotes. The problem
of vendor's quotations might be considered to present a special situation since, as
previously noted, certain vendor's quotes could be intentionally withheld from the cost
data submitted in the hope of later achieving certain cost savings and a corresponding
increase in profits. While the proposed amendment envisions the contractor sub-
mitting all data developed by his estimating personnel this would not appear to
require the contractor to submit all of the vendor's quotes which have not been dis-
carded as clearly unreasonable.
47. E.g., Gusman, supra note 36, at 734; Hannah, supra note 43, at 41; Petit &
Joseph, Governments' Obligation to Disclose Under the Truth in Negotiations Act,
10 WM. & MARY L. REV. 18, 35 (1968) ; Comment, supra note 29, at 607; Comment,
The Truth-In-Negotiations Act - An Examination of Defective Pricing in Govern-
ment Contracts, 54 VA. L. REV. 505, 517 (1968).
48. 10 U.S.C. § 2306(f) (1964) (emphasis added).
49. ASBCA No. 10305, 65-2 BCA 24,838 (1965).
50. Actually, the Board had before it a contract provision typical of the pre-
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the Board explicitly held that the Government must prove that the con-
tractor provided it with inaccurate, incomplete and noncurrent data and
that this data caused a significant increase in the contract price. However,
the Board did recognize the problem which exists in attempting to deter-
mine the effect of an overstated cost when the contract was negotiated
on a firm fixed-price basis in which costs are not individualized. 51 In re-
jecting any notion of determining the effect of nondisclosed data based on
mere speculation the Board stated:
In the absence of any more specific evidence tending to show
what effect the nondisclosure of the pricing data had on the negoti-
ated target cost, we are of the opinion that we should adopt the natural
and probable consequence of the nondisclosure as representating its
effect. 52
The Board concluded that the Government was entitled to a price reduction
since the "natural and probable consequence" of the failure to disclose the
cost data was to significantly increase the contract price. This interpreta-
tion of the Act seemed to reveal a disposition on the part of the Board to
lighten the Government's burden of proof where the Board felt it to be
appropriate.
However, the Board appeared to revert to a more strict interpretation
of the Act's causation requirement in Defense Electronics, Inc.' s In that
case, the Government had awarded a contract to Defense Electronics for
telemetry pre-detection systems to be used on the Atlantic Missile Range.
The Government claimed that the submitted data was defective since it
did not disclose certain relevant data bearing on the costs of certain
conversion kits. The Board rejected the Government's claim holding that
it was "incumbent on the Government to show that the change order price
adjustment was overstated BECAUSE of the contractor's failure to dis-
close or its improper disclosure of data."'5 4 This shift in position by the
Board on the issue of causation was more apparent than actual. In Cutler-
Hammer, Inc.,5 the contractor had failed to disclose certain pertinent
vendor's quotations which he had received for components of a complex
reconnaissance system. The Board remarkably admitted that at the time
of contract negotiations the untried vendor's quotations were not reliable
51. The Board stated on this matter:
This case illustrates the difficulty of establishing that nondisclosure of pricing
data concerning a specific cost element caused an increase in the negotiated total
price when there was no agreement or understanding with respect to specific
cost elements.
ASBCA No. 10305, 65-2 BCA at 24,853.
52. Id.
53. ASBCA No. 11127, 66-1 BCA 26,191 (1966). See also FMC Corp., ASBCA
Nos. 10095 § 11113, 66-1 BCA 25,697 (1966).
54. ASBCA No. 11127, 66-1 BCA at 26,202.
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data upon which to negotiate a price 6 but, despite this admission, held that
the nondisclosure by the contractor caused a significant increase in the
contract price since the Government might have delayed execution of the
contract until the pertinent data was submitted or, in the alternative, might
have excluded this particular item of cost from the contract price, thus,
reserving it for further negotiation. Despite the uncertainty as to what
effect the nondisclosure actually caused, the Board glossed over the causa-
tion requirement:
While we recognize that we could never find with complete cer-
tainty just what the parties would have done if this matter had been
disclosed to the Government, we are convinced that something con-
tractually different would have been developed to cover the situation
as it then existed. In Defense Electronics, Inc .... we held that the
Government has the burden of proving the causal relationship between
significant, non-disclosed, pricing data and the resulting contract price
reduction. However, we did not then, nor do we here, intend that that
burden be an unreasonably heavy one.
Accordingly . . . we are of the opinion that the Government
has established the reasonable probability that with a disclosure of the
Transco quotation, the parties would have agreed that the cost of the
Luneberg Lens would be excluded from the contract price, and re-
served for further negotiations and addition to the contract price at a
later date. 57
It is suggested that the decision in Cutler-Hammer, coupled with the
latest regulations 58 have shifted the burden of proof to the contractor to
show that a nondisclosure of information did not cause a significant in-
crease in the contract price to the Government. "9 This is apparent from the
fact that in Cutler-Hammer, even though the vendor's quotations were
admitted to be unreliable at the time of contract negotiations and that the
Board could not conclude what effect the nondisclosure had on the total
contract price, the Board still held that the Government was entitled to
an equitable reduction of the contract price. It is obvious that the Board
56. The Board stated:
The foregoing resumE of the development [of the vendor's quotation problems]
can only lead to the conclusion that at the time of contract negotiations . . . and
again on the date of execution of the Defective Pricing Certificate . . . the . . .
quotation was far from being data upon which a firm price reduction could have
been reached....
Id. at 29,828 (emphasis added).
57. Id. at 29,828-29.
58. The Armed Services Procurement Regulations appear to even further weaken
the causation requirement in providing that:
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the natural and probable conse-
quence of defective data is an increase in the contract price in the amount of
the defect plus related burden and profit or fee; therefore, unless there is a clearindication that the defective data was not used, or was not relied upon, the con-
tract price was reduced in that amount.
ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 3.807-5 (Supp. 1970).
59. Compare Hannah, supra note 43, at 41, with Comment, The Truth-In-
Negotiations Act - An Examination of Defective Pricing in Government Contracts,
54 VA. L. REV. 505, 520 (1968), where the notewriter contends that the requirement
of causation has been properly eliminated by the Cutler-Hammer opinion.
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was imposing on the contractor the burden of proving that his nondis-
closure did not effect the total contract price or the negotiations upon
which the price was based. This burden of proof clearly places the Gov-
ernment in the advantageous position of being able to utilize "hindsight."
If the Government only has to establish, as it did in Cutler-Hammer, that
if certain data had been disclosed to it during negotiations it would have
either delayed execution of the contract or would have reserved negotia-
tions on that particular cost item for a future date, then the contractor has
the near-impossible task of disproving such a statement. Moreover, to es-
tablish that the Government might have adopted one of these alternatives
has no bearing at all on the effect which the nondisclosure had on the con-
tract price but only reveals how the Government might have altered its
contract negotiations.
It is posited that the Board is wrong in the approach it has adopted
in Cutler-Hammer and that it should revise its position on the causation
requirement.60  The statutory language of the Act reflects an intent on
the part of Congress that the Government establish that the contract price
was increased because of defective data submitted by the contractor. 61 It
would be difficult to imagine a contrary intent since it is only the Govern-
nent that could establish that the undisclosed data would have caused it
to seek a lower contract price. While this view may present difficulties in
light of the acknowledged practice of the Government to negotiate on the
basis of "total price" and not the individualization of costs, it would appear
to be unfair and inequitable to impose oi the contractor the heavy burden
of disproving what is only speculation on the part of the Government
merely because of a method of negotiation which the Government, and not
the contractor, has elected to pursue. 62 It can be presumed that Congress
was aware of this method of negotiation when the Act was passed, but
neither the congressional hearings nor the Act itself provide any hint that
Congress intended to impose on the contractor the onerous burden which
the Board has imposed in Cutler-Hammer.
Consequently, it is suggested that the Board should reappraise its cur-
rent aproach to the causation requirement and reaffirm the test which
it formulated in Defense Electronics, Inc.63 where it stated:
In order for the Government to have any valid claim, it must be
established (1) that the contractor furnished inaccurate, incomplete
or non-current pricing data in connection with the negotiation of the
price adjustment for the change order, (2) that the inaccurate, in-
complete or non-current pricing data caused the price adjustment for
the change order to be increased, and (3) the dollar amount by which
60. Hannah, supra note 43, at 41.
61. See note 20 supra.
62. But see Bannerman, supra note 42, at 36, where the writer approves of a
method which creates a rebuttable presumption that the cost overstatement by the
contractor caused the increase in contract price which the contractor has a right
to challenge.
63. ASBCA No. 11127, 66-1 BCA 26,191.
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the price adjustment for the change order was increased as a result
thereof. The Government has the burden of proving every element in
the chain of proof necessary to substantiate its claim. . . . It is in-
cumbent on the Government to show that the change order price
adjustment was overstated BECAUSE of the contractor's failure to
disclose or its improper disclosure of data. 4
This approach would assure that once the Government has successfully
shown that its contract price was significantly higher because of defective
cost or pricing data, it will be entitled to an equitable reduction of the
contract price. This view is entirely consistent with the language of the
statute and promotes the purpose of the Act in that once the Government
has met its burden of proof, the contractor will not be allowed to retain
the benefits of his deception.
V. OFFSETS
Since the enactment of the Truth-In-Negotiations Act, considerable
controversy has arisen as to whether only a downward revision of the con-
tract price, due to overstated costs by the contractor, would be allowed.
Many commentators have expressed the view that the statute should not
be a "one-way street" and that if a contractor inadvertently understates
the costs of certain items then the contract price should be revised up-
ward. 6 Prior to the passage of the Act, the ASPR contained price
adjustment provisions which stipulated that the contract price "shall be
equitably reduced" because of defective cost or pricing data.6 6 This
provision was construed in American Bosch Arma Corp.67 to allow the
contractor to offset certain cost items which would have reduced the con-
tract price against those cost items which would have increased the con-
tract price. However, in Lockheed Aircraft Corp.6 s the Board greatly re-
64. Id. at 26,201-26.
65. E.g., Cibinic, note 44 supra; Petit, The Defective Pricing Law and Imple-
menting Regulations - A Year and a Half Later, 29 LAW & CONTEMP. PROD. 552,
560-61 (1964) ; Comment, supra note 29, at 617-20.
66. Most government contracts contain a price reduction clause similar to
the following:
(a) If the Contracting Officer determines that any price negotiated in con-
nection with this contract was overstated because the Contractor, or any
first-tier subcontractor in connection with a subcontract covered by (c)
below, either (i) failed to disclose any significant cost or (ii) suppressed
any significant cost or pricing data which he knew or reasonably should
have known was false or misleading, then such price shall be equitably
reduced and the contract shall be modified in writing accordingly.
(b) Failure to agree on equitable reduction shall be a dispute concerning
a question of fact within the meaning of the "Disputes" clause of
this contract.(c) The Contractor agrees to insert the substance of paragraph (a) of this
clause in any of his subcontracts hereunder in excess of $100,000 unless
the price is based on adequate price competition, established catalogue
or market prices, or prices set by law or regulation.
14 C.C.F. 88, 617, at 88,623 (emphasis added).
67. ASBCA No. 10305, 65-2 BCA 24,838 (1965).
68. ASBCA No. 10453, 67-1 BCA 29,439 (1967).
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stricted the contractor's right to offset. In this case Lockheed had at-
tempted to offset against certain overstated costs its claims for royalties
and development costs which it excluded from its price proposal. The
Board rejected the contractor's claim holding that only "closely related"
costs may be offset against each other. It stated that:
It is obvious to us that these two cost items were only remotely re-
lated to the "material costs" in issue . . . The obvious answer to the
offsetting suggestion is that the equitable reduction permitted under
the clause is intended to cover solely the cost item concerning which
the pricing data was defective. To permit unrelated offsets would be
tantamount to repricing the entire contract which is not within the
contemplation of the clause. 9
It had become clear, therefore, that the Board and the Defense Depart-
ment 70 had adopted, prior to the passage of the Act, the rather narrow
and restricted view that offsets were to be allowed only when the costs
were closely related.
It is not clear from the legislative history of the Act whether offsets
in favor of the contractor were contemplated by Congress. The congres-
sional hearings on P.L. 87-653 do indicate an effort to assure that con-
tractors would not be injured by honest understatements of costs. These
efforts did not result in any specific language favoring contractors but the
debate on this issue was lively and in some instances rather enlightening.
For example, William H. Moore, an industry spokesman, advocated ex-
press language in the statute favoring contractors who understate their
costs. The following discussion enused:
Mr. Moore: The language as it stands provides only a one-way street.
It is unfair, I believe, to contractors, because it says nothing about
the situation in which hindsight may reveal that there have been
mistakes that accrued to the Government's benefit.
Senator Symington: Don't reach out for the last cherry to the point
where you break this branch ... you do not want to make an excess
profit even as the result of an honest mistake.
Senator Cannon: Now, Senator Symington has just simply said that
you would not want to use, to be in a position of advocating by the
use of inaccurate, incomplete and noncurrent data and building up
your target price, even though it was inadvertent at the time, that
you would then want that measurement to determine how much of
an incentive you were going to get.
69. Id. at 29,450.
70. After the enactment of the Truth-In-Negotiations Act, the Department of
Defense adopted a policy which prohibited offsets and opposed an amendment which
would have allowed offsets. See Comment, supra note 59, at 523; H.R. 7909, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). This was coupled with a change in ASPR which eliminated
the phrase "price shall be equitably reduced" and substituted that the price "be
reduced accordingly." ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 7-104.29 (Supp. 1970). The Board's
decision in Lockheed has necessarily altered that policy.
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Senator Symington: Again, if you make an honest mistake, you
should not be rewarded with additional profit; and if you cheat as
to what is estimated cost, you should pay for it.7
There can be little doubt that this language indicates an intent that the
Government did not seek to act as an insurer for the contractor's mistake
so that he could be rewarded with additional profit if he understated his
contract price. However, the language cannot be understood to stand for
the proposition that understatements cannot be offset against overstate-
ments to the extent of any overstatements. The Court of Claims in Cutler-
Hammer, Inc. v. United States72 adopted this approach in allowing offsets
in favor of the contractor finding that neither the statute nor the legisla-
tive history provided a clear-cut answer. In Cutler-Hammer, Inc.,73 the
Board considered for the first time since the enactment of the Truth-In-
Negotiations law the problem of offsets. As previously noted,74 Cutler-
Hammer had contracted to develop and manufacture a highly-complex
reconnaissance system. In formulating its price proposal, the contractor
inadvertently duplicated certain materials causing a cost overstatement.
However, the contractor had also underestimated the costs of certain other
materials in an amount exceeding the overstatements. The costs involved
in both the overstatements and understatements were closely related since
both involved purchased parts and components. Despite the closely related
nature of the costs, the Board rejected the contractor's contention that offset
should be allowed. The Board made the following pertinent remarks:
Although reasonable men may certainly differ on this interpreta-
tion, it is our conclusion that the Defective Pricing Statute (PL 87-
653, 10 Sept. 1962; 76 Stat. 528) was intended solely as a vehicle for
recoupment by the Government of overpricing resulting from any of
the causes enumerated therein. On the other hand, there are now and
were prior to the enactment of that legislation certain remedies avail-
able to contractors for the correction of mistakes such as appellant
proposes by way of counterclaims and offset here. We must assume
the Congress was aware of these remedial avenues when it enacted
PL 87-653. In this regard we have not overlooked the fact that these
remedies may be more restrictive than the corresponding remedy of
the Government under the Defective Pricing procedure. The simple
answer to this is that both the statute and the contractual provision
which it implements, literally limit the adjustment to pricing defici-
encies which tend to overstate the contract price. As such we would
need to be shown a clear Congressional intent that all costs and pricing
deficiencies, regardless of their nature or direction, were correctable
under the statute before we could grant that relief here. On this point
we must, of course, recognize that there is some indication in the leg-
71. See Hearings, supra note 12, at 100-02.
72. 416 F.2d 1306, 1310-13 (Ct. C1. 1969).
73. ASBCA No. 10900, 67-2 BCA 29,822 (1967).
74. See text accompanying notes 29 & 30 supra.
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islative history that the result we here reach may not have been in-
tended. By the same token there is just as much, if not more, evi-dence that such was the Congressional purpose. As a consequence
we cannot say that the Congressional purpose in this regard is con-
clusively evident one way or the other. We are therefore constrained
to adopt a literal interpretation of the statute, and, if we err, it is for
others, be it the Congress or the courts, to set the matter right.75
On appeal, the United States Court of Claims reversed the Board on
the offset issue holding that the Truth-In-Negotiations Act permitted over-
statements in cost estimates to be offset by underestimates, but only to
the extent of overestimates. 76
As previously indicated, the court felt that neither the statute nor
legislative history clearly indicated Congress' intent on the question of
offsets, 77 although it was absolutely clear that when only overstatements
were involved a downward revision in the contract price was proper. The
court in reaching its conclusion that offsets should be allowed to Cutler-
Hammer looked to the purpose behind the Truth-In-Negotiations Act.
Clearly, one of the purposes was to not only prohibit contractors from
withholding known information about costs but to reward them for ef-ficient performance in negotiation. However, offsetting inaccurate cost
data in the instant case would not have the effect of rewarding the con-
tractor but only of assuring him that he is entitled to the same price ad-justments as the Government. Moreover, any excess of overstatements
above underestimates would reduce the contract price by that anount. 78
The court also rejected the Government's contention that allowing offsets
would permit "buying-in" on Government contracts. 79 The court realized
that to permit upward revision of the contract price would encourage con-
tractors to underestimate their costs in order to buy into a contract and
75. ASBCA No. 10900, 67-2 BCA 29,822, 29,826-27.
76. As previously indicated, the cost items involved in this case were closelyrelated and therefore the Court of Claims did not address the question of whetheroffsets would be allowed when the cost items were not closely related. However, itwould seem that only closely related costs will be offset against each other since theLockheed decision specifically limits offsetting to that category and the Court ofClaims in the instant decision gave no indication of altering that position. See text
accompanying note 68 supra.
77. See text accompanying notes 71-72 supra.
78. The court also rejected the Government's argument that only a downwardrevision of price is allowed under the Act since the language of the Act only refers to"reducing" the contract price. The court interpreted this language to mean "thatwhere overstatements exceed understatements, the excess reduces the price; con-versely, where understatements exceed overstatements, the price is not raised." 416F.2d at 1312 (emphasis added).
79. "Buying-in" has been defined in the following terms:Attempting to obtain a contract award by knowingly offering a price or costestimate less than anticipated costs with the expectation of either (1) increasingthe contract price or estimated cost during the period of performance throughchange orders or other means, or (2) receiving future "follow-on" contracts atprices high enough to recover any losses on the original "buy-in" contract.
ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 1.311 (Supp. 1970).
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later have the contract price adjusted upwards to recover the amount of the
understatement. The court, in recognizing the injustice which would result
to the Government from this practice, stated that:
In our case, however, there were both overstatements and un-
derstatements, and to the extent that the dollar amount of over-
statements matched the dollar amount of understatements, the con-
tract price was not reduced to effect "buying-in." Since, in our opin-
ion, offsets should be allowed to the extent of overstatements only,
and no more, the contractor cannot lower his costs and thereafter
attempt to recoup any of his understatements in excess of overstate-
ments. By virtue of this limitation, there is nothing to be gained by a
contractor underestimating his costs, since he can never get an upward
revision in price later on.80
It is suggested that the Court of Claims was correct in mitigating
the harsh rule adopted by the Board in Cutler-Hammer, Inc. One com-
mentator had proposed an amendment after the Board's decision, claiming
that "as a minimum, all honest errors in the same cost element should be
considered."8' However, if the decision in Cutler-Hammer, Inc. v. United
States is uniformly adhered to in subsequent cases, there would not appear
to be a need for legislative revision, since the decision does not appear to
frustrate any of the purposes of the Act and is firmly supported by basic
considerations of fairness.
As previously noted, the purpose of the Truth-In-Negotiations Act is
to provide the Government with detailed cost information in order to pre-
vent excessive profiteering by contractors.8 2 This purpose does not seem
frustrated by allowing a contractor to offset understatements to the extent
of overstatements on closely related cost items. There is no upward re-
vision of the contract price which would result in the contractor receiving
"windfall profits" or which might encourage "buying-in." Rather, it would
80. 416 F.2d at 1312. Judge Davis dissented on this issue of offsets for two basic
reasons. First, he felt that what little legislative history there was dealing with offsets
appeared to favor the Government's position. See Hearings, supra note 12, at 100-02;
and Roback, supra note 19, at 23. Secondly, Judge Davis felt that one of the goals
of the Act was to achieve more carefully prepared and more accurate price proposals
and that the decision of the majority would condone carelessness instead of penalizing
it. 416 F.2d at 1317-18 (dissenting opinion).
81. Cibinic, supra note 44, at 55. It should also be noted that in 1967 the Depart-
ment of Defense agreed to limited offsets in two types of situations: (1) When data
represents an average or composite rate and there is a question concerning a specific
item of that data; and (2) When the understatement and overstatement relate to the
same particular type of item then the two costs can be offset against each other.
Defense Procurement Circ. No. 57 amending ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 3-807.5 (Supp.
1970). It can be seen that this amendment greatly restricts the permissible types of
offsets by limiting them to items of the same type, whereas the decisions in Lockheed
and Cutler-Hammer allow offsetting of closely related costs. See text accompanying
notes 68 & 76 supra.
82. See S. REP. No. 1884, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1962). See also Gusman, supra
note 36, at 709, where the author states the Act "is primarily directed to the problem
of assuring reasonable prices for items procured where there is neither adequate price
competition nor the safeguards which normally flow from economic forces at work
in a truly competitive market."
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appear that the purpose of the Act is being served since a contractor is put
on notice by the Court of Claims decision in Cutler-Hammer that he has
nothing to gain by withholding or underestimating pertinent cost data since
the contract price will never be revised upward.
8 3
Moreover, this decision, in allowing offsets to the contractor, is firmly
grounded in considerations of fairness. It is clearly inequitable to penalize
the contractor for one honest mistake of an overstatement and yet not allow
him to have the benefit of a similar honest mistake of an understatement.
Furthermore, the Act should not be viewed solely as a vehicle for Govern-
ment recovery but should also encompass the goal of assuring the contrac-
tor that the standards implemented for Government recovery will also be
the standards implemented for contractor recovery.
VI. RESPONSIBILITY OF A PRIME CONTRACTOR FOR A
SUBCONTRACTOR'S DEFECTIVE DATA
The Truth-In-Negotiations Act requires a subcontractor to submit
cost or pricing data.8 4 The problem has arisen as to whether the prime
contractor is liable if the data submitted by the subcontractor is defective.
The Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals addressed itself to this
problem in Lockheed Aircraft Corp.85 which involved a fixed priced sub-
contract between the prime contractor - Lockheed and the subcontrac-
tor - Midwestern. The subcontract provided that Midwestern was to
furnish Lockheed with a necessary component of an electronic monitoring
and recovery system which Lockheed had contracted to furnish to the
Government. The Government required the prime contractor to insert
in the subcontract a price reduction clause which stipulated that if the
subcontract price was overstated because of nondisclosure of significant
cost or pricing data, then either the Government or the contractor could
equitably reduce the subcontract price.8 " The prime contract between the
83. Assuming that the dissent in Cutler-Hammer, Inc. v. United States is correct
in stating that one of the purposes of the Act is to promote more careful price proposals
from the contractor, (see note 80 supra), there is no evidence whatsoever that the
instant decision will result in careless price proposals. One commentator rejected the
dissent's view in the following terms:
The argument that permitting offsets would encourage lax and sloppy pricing
practices on the part of the contractors is not convincing. A contractor would
have very little to gain in following such practices. Offsets can only be used
defensively. By using poor pricing practices, the contractor takes the very real
risk that his price will be grossly understated, which is definitely to his dis-
advantage. Thus, it is difficult to see how equitable treatment would motivate
contractors in that direction.
Cibinic, supra note 44, at 55.
84. 10 U.S.C. § 2306(f) (1964). See note 20 supra.
85. ASBCA No. 10453, 67-1 BCA 29,439 (1967).
86. Lockheed's subcontract contained the following clause:
If the buyer or the Government determines that any price negotiated in con-
nection with this contract was overstated because the Seller either (1) failed to
disclose any significant cost or pricing data, or (2) furnished any significant cost
or pricing data which he knew or reasonably should have known was false or
misleading, then such price shall be equitably reduced and the contract shall be
modified in writing accordingly.
See 14 C.C.F. 88,617, at 88,622.
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Government and Lockheed also provided that the Government was entitled
to a reduction of the prime contract price if either the contractor or the
subcontractor submitted defective cost data.8 7 At the time the subcontract
was negotiated, Midwestern had already purchased more than 90% of
the materials required to produce the component, yet, the data it sub-
mitted to Lockheed overstated significant costs. It appeared that prior to
completion of the negotiations with Lockheed, a Government audit was
made of the subcontractor's records at which time the subcontractor offered
to submit to the Government a list of materials already purchased. This
information would have revealed the overstatements, however, the Govern-
ment audit team rejected the offer. Additionally, the prime contractor had
also neglected to solicit the subcontractor's list of historical costs and, there-
fore, also failed to discover the cost overestimates. When the error was
discovered, the Government brought suit against the prime contractor
claiming a refund from the reduction of the prime contract price.88
On these facts the Board held that the prime contractor was liable
to the Government under the price reduction clause of the prime contract
to the same extent that the subcontractor was liable to the prime contractor
under the price reduction clause of the subcontract since Midwestern had
failed to disclose the pertinent cost data during contract negotiations. The
Board emphasized the fault of the subcontractor and concluded that Lock-
heed was liable even though Midwestern had totally failed to inform
Lockheed of the significant cost data. Furthermore, it took the position
that since the prime contractor's own subcontractor had failed to disclose
significant data the prime contractor could be penalized for this breach
even though the subcontractor was at fault.8 9
On appeal, the Trial Commissioner for the Court of Claims re-
versed, 90 holding that the Government was not entitled to a price reduction
against Lockheed even though the prime contract had been overpriced. The
87. The prime contract provided in pertinent part:
(a) If the Contracting Officer determines that any price, including profit or
fee, negotiated in connection with this contract was increased by any
significant sums because the Contractor, or any subcontractor in connec-
tion with a subcontract covered by (c) below, furnished incomplete or
inaccurate cost or pricing data or data not current as certified in the
Contractor's Certificate of Current Cost or Pricing Data, then such price
shall be reduced accordingly and the contract shall be modified in writing
to reflect such adjustment.
(b) Failure to agree on a reduction shall be a dispute concerning a question
of fact within the meaning of the "Disputes" clause of this contract.
(c) The Contractor agrees to insert the substance of paragraphs (a) and (c)
of this clause in each of his cost-reimbursement type, price redetermi-
nable, or incentive subcontracts hereunder, and in any other subcontract
hereunder in excess of $100,000 unless the price is based on adequate price
competition, established catalog or market prices of commercial items
sold in substantial quantities to the general public, or prices set by law
or regulation.
14 C.C.F. 88,617, at 88,622.
88. ASBCA No. 10453, 67-1 BCA 29,439 (1967).
89. Id. at 29,445.
90. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 14 C.C.F. 88,617 (1969).
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Commissioner preferred not to base his decision on the admitted nondis-
closure of Midwestern as the Board did, but rather limited his consider-
ation to whether or not Lockheed was at fault. In reaching his decision
the Commissioner reasoned that, while the prime contractor had a duty
to disclose data relevant to its own costs, it would be unreasonable to hold
the prime contractor liable for nondisclosure by the subcontractor since
the subcontractor was in the best position to furnish such information and
that finding the prime contractor liable would be tantamount to holding
him responsible for the acts of the subcontractor. Clearly, Lockheed could
not be as familiar with Midwestern's data as Midwestern would be. The
Commissioner conceded that by not holding Lockheed responsible it would
profit from the overpricing of the subcontractor. 91 However, the Commis-
sioner felt that when the prime contractor could not reasonably know that
the subcontractor had withheld data, it should not be penalized. Further-
more, the Government is not without a remedy merely because it cannot
reduce the price of the prime contract. Recognizing that Midwestern was
not in privity with the Government, the Commissioner still held that the
Government could proceed directly against Midwestern on the theory that
the Government was a third-party beneficiary to the contract between
Lockheed and Midwestern and that Midwestern, therefore, had a duty to
disclose current, complete and accurate data to the Government. 92 The
Commissioner also felt that even though the Government was limited in
its recovery to the overpricing of the subcontract and could not recover
Lockheed's profit on this overpricing, this "is the price paid by the Govern-
ment for the advantage of being allowed to dictate the terms of the sub-
tract, without being in privity with the subcontractor."9 3 He noted that
Lockheed was at fault in not pursuing reasonable vigilance in obtaining
91. This profit results from the fact that the prime contract price includes profit
determined from a percentage of the cost of the prime contract, and the subcontract
price is included in the prime contract price.
92. In reaching its decision that the Government was a third party beneficiary
to the contract between Lockheed and Midwestern, the Commissioner relied on the
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 133(1) (a), which states in pertinent part:
(1) Where performance of a promise in a contract will benefit a person other
than the promisee, that person is...
(a) A donee beneficiary if it appears from the terms of the promise
in. view of the accompanying circumstances that the purpose of the
promisee in obtaining the promise of all or part of the performance
thereof is to make a gift to the beneficiary or to confer upon him
a right against the promisor to some performance neither due nor
supposed or asserted to be due from the promisee to the beneficiary.
The Commissioner went on to state:
Applying the Restatement of the present case, it seems obvious that it was
the view of the promisee (Lockheed) in obtaining the promisor's (Midwestern)
promise to disclose data, to confer on the Government a right against the promisor.
The subcontract clause states that "[if] the buyer or the Government determines
that any price negotiated in connection with this contract was overstated .. .then
such price shall be equitably reduced ... ." Since this clause was included because
of the Government's insistence, it must be for the Government's benefit. (Em-
phasis supplied).




Williams: The Truth-in-Negotiations Act: The Need for Both Truth and Fairne
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1970
NOVEMBER 1970]
the list of historical costs of Midwestern during their negotiations. How-
ever, the Commissioner further noted that Lockheed's breach was cured by
the Government's audit of Midwestern's records since that audit should
have revealed significant and reasonably available data. In relying on the
doctrine of waiver and holding that to the extent of the Government's
investigation, Lockheed was relieved of liability, the Commissioner stated
that :
As we view it, the significance of the September 1962 audit is
to give the Government an opportunity to be vigilant in its own behalf.
To the extent the Government investigates, Lockheed's duty to protect
the Government is superseded. The measure by which Lockheed's
duty is superseded is the extent to which the Government had a rea-
sonable opportunity to take advantage of the significant and reason-
ably available data which its investigation revealed, or should have
revealed, to it. To hold otherwise would mean that Lockheed is under
a greater duty to protect the Government's interest than the Govern-
ment itself is. But Lockheed is a contractor - not a fiduciary. And
our view is merely an application of the contract doctrine of waiver.94
It has been suggested by one commentator, prior to the Commis-
sioner's decision, that the solution to the problem of the liability of the
prime contractor would be to resort to the Disputes clause of the prime
contract whereby the Government would reduce the price of the prime
contract and the prime contractor would, in turn, pass the price reduction
on to the subcontractor, simultaneously subrogating the prime contrac-
tor's right of appeal to the subcontractor.95 Perhaps the reasoning behind
94. Id. at 88,630 (emphasis added). The Commissioner went on to state:
Continued performance, with knowledge that a condition (i.e., a duty) has
not been performed, operates as a waiver. Of course, the Government will
probably not want to terminate the contract just because it realizes the prime
contractor has not protected the Government's interest in having subcontract
data disclosed. The purpose of many of the specialized clauses in Government
contracts is to enable the parties to go forward, and still preserve their rights, in
situations where this would not be possible under the common law. So, too, under
the defective data clause. The Government may continue performance after
learning that available data has not been utilized in the subcontract negotiations,
without losing its right to a price reduction; but it cannot proceed forever. The
rational deadline, in connection with subcontract data, is the prime contract nego-
tiations. At that point, the Government must take advantage of whatever utilizable
subcontract pricing data it learned (or should have learned) of in its inspection
(if any) prior to the prime contract negotiations. (Obviously, if the Government
learned of subcontract pricing data only immediately prior to the negotiations,
such data would not be "utilizable").
95. Id. See Cibinic, supra note 44, at 55-57.
The standard Disputes clause found in government contracts provide as
follows:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this contract, any dispute concerning a
question of fact arising under this contract which is not disposed of by
agreement shall be decided by the Contracting Officer, who shall reduce
his decision to writing and mail or otherwise furnish a copy thereof to
the Contractor. The decision of the Contracting Officer shall be final and
conclusive unless, within 30 days from the date of receipt of such copy,
the Contractor mails or otherwise furnishes to the Contracting Officer a
written appeal addressed to the Secretary. The decision of the Secretary
or his duly authorized representative for the determination of such appeals
shall be final and conclusive unless determined by a court of competent
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such a proposed solution is grounded in the belief that when the prime
contractor has been relieved of responsibility for the subcontractor's
wrong, it has the effect of penalizing the Government by depriving it of
recovery of the excess profits secured by the prime contractor. Perhaps
it is also felt that as between the Government and the prime contractor,
the latter should bear the loss because the prime contractor selected the
subcontractor. A third justification might be that because the prime con-
tractor is in privity with the subcontractor, it makes it easier for the prime
contractor to deal with the subcontractor.
However, it is suggested that there are two reasons why this solution
is inappropriate and the Trial Commissioner's view should be adopted.
First, any use of the Disputes clause presupposes that there is an agree-
ment between the two parties to use the clause. This agreement would be
highly doubtful where the subcontractor has already been paid the sub-
contract price. In this situation, the prime contractor would be required to
litigate his claim in court with the result that the court may find that the
subcontractor was not at fault, thereby penalizing the prime contractor.9"
Secondly, based on essential considerations of fairness, it would
appear that the position of the Commissioner is correct. While both the
Board and the Commissioner recognized the fault of Midwestern, the
Commissioner alone reached a solution most equitable to all the parties
involved. The Board assumed that the unknowing prime contractor must
bear the responsibility for the subcontractor's defective data, while the
Commissioner emphasized the essential unfairness of penalizing the prime
contractor. The purpose of the Act is to assure that the Government can
secure a reduction in the contract price when a contractor fails to disclose
accurate, complete, and current data and to see that the contractor at fault
does not receive "windfall" profits from his deception. Clearly, the pur-
pose of the Act is served by the Commissioner's decision, since the Gov-
ernment as third party beneficiary can directly recover from the subcon-
tractor the amount of the overpricing created by his nondisclosure, and
thereby deprive him of any windfall profits. Moreover, the unknowing
prime contractor is not penalized by the deception of the subcontractor.
It is suggested, therefore, that the Commissioner's approach be adopted
jurisdiction to have been fraudulent, or capricious, or arbitrary, or so
grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply bad faith, or not supported by
substantial evidence. In connection with any appeal proceeding under this
clause, the Contractor shall be afforded an opportunity to be heard and
to offer evidence in support of his appeal. Pending final decision of adispute hereunder, the Contractor shall proceed diligently with the per-
formance of the contract and in accordance with the Contracting
Officer's decision.
(b) This "Disputes" clause does not preclude consideration of law questions
in connection with decisions provided for in paragraph (a) above;
provided, that nothing in this contract shall be construed as making final
the decision of any administrative official, representative, or board on a
question of law.




Williams: The Truth-in-Negotiations Act: The Need for Both Truth and Fairne
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1970
NOVEMBER 1970]
to effectuate the purposes of the Act and to assure that when the prime
contractor is truthful in his negotiations and the subcontractor is untruth-
ful, the Government can secure an equitable reduction of the subcontract
price.97
VII. CONCLUSION
The value of truthful negotiations is unquestionable. The need for
accurate, complete, and current cost or pricing data is obvious to achieve
the Government objective of eliminating excessive profitmaking by con-
tractors. However, in order for the Truth-In-Negotiations Act to remain
effective, the administration of the Act should reflect fairness to all the
parties connected with a Government contract. In seeking to achieve this
fairness, it is suggested that clear guidelines be adopted so as to inform
the contractor what cost or pricing data must be submitted. It also seems
appropriate that the Government should bear the burden of proof as to
what effect certain nondisclosures may have on the total contract price
and, concomitantly, to relieve the contractor from the onerous burden of
proving non-reliance. Clearly, considerations of fairness also dictate that
since the Government is allowed to reduce the contract price the con-
tractor should also be allowed to offset understated costs to the extent of any
overstatementts. The view has also been advanced that the knowing prime
contractor should not be held responsible for defective data submitted by a
subcontractor. Rather, the Government should seek a recovery from the
subcontractor directly. It is urged that if these views are accepted by
the Board and the courts, greater fairness will result to contractors and
the Government will be able to continue to effectively enforce truthful
contract negotiations.
Ward T. Williams
97. For a discussion of differing viewpoints on the problem of the prime con-
tractor's liability, see Cibinic, supra note 44, at 55; Gusman, supra note 36, at 740-43;
Petit, supra note 47, at 558-59; Hannah, supra note 43, at 42.
COMMENTS
24
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [1970], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol16/iss1/6
